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The IMI Working Papers Series 
The IMI working paper series presents current research in the field of international migration. The 
series was initiated by the International Migration Institute (IMI) since its founding at the University 
of Oxford in 2006. The papers in this series (1) analyse migration as part of broader global change, (2) 
contribute to new theoretical approaches, and (3) advance understanding of the multilevel forces 
driving migration and experiences of migration. 
 
Abstract  
Despite seemingly open immigration policies and rights-based reforms, the six Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries recently engaged in international and domestic policies to better control 
immigration. This article unpacks the realpolitik of mass immigration conducted by the Gulf states by 
showing how they use retaliatory and coercive migration diplomacies as well as migrant rights-
washing on the international scene to shape immigration flows. At the domestic level, Gulf 
governments’ reforms seek to police labour market segmentation and institutionalise a regime of 
“differential exclusion” that officialises intersectional discriminations across nationalities and class. 
Drawing upon sources in English and Arabic, as well as interviews with public officials, businessmen, 
and migrants in the region over a decade (2006-2017), this article describes how states and nonstate 
actors, including businessmen, migrant networks, and brokers, operate policies and practices of 
control.  
I first find that a recent sovereign turn has transformed migration politics in the Gulf. I show that 
contingent state policies and reforms in the past decades more accurately account for migration 
governance processes than oil prices and market dynamics, the nature of political regimes, or the 
rentier structures of Gulf polities. This study thus fills a gap in migration research on the Global South 
that usually focuses on emigration countries and diaspora policies and underestimates the role of 
immigration policies.  
Secondly, I find that migration policies have become more discriminatory across migrant categories in 
the GCC, as other studies have shown for OECD countries. Such findings lead us to discuss the global 
relevance of illiberal practices and policies and introduce the hypothesis of a global convergence in 
illiberal migration governance. 
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Introduction 
Since the late 2000s, immigration to six oil and gas-producing countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) — Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman — has 
rapidly increased. This second migration “boom” echoes the one that happened in the early 1970 with 
the rise of oil prices.  Compared to the immigration boom of the 1970s, which mostly brought in Arab 
immigrants from neighbouring Arab countries, this second, large immigration push has brought to the 
Gulf immigrants from more diverse origins, mainly from Asia. It has also happened in the context of 
major policy reforms that introduced labour rights for both nationals and migrants as opposed to the 
weak legal and policy framework of the 1970s. In sum, immigration to the Gulf seemingly became 
more global and migration governance more regulated. As such, the Gulf seems to support the global 
“convergence” hypothesis (Rosenblum and Cornelius 2012; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; 
Hollifield 1992), which predicts that international migration governance tends to be more and more 
rights based and that migration trends tend to be increasingly driven by market dynamics, leading to 
more diverse and global immigration trends. Both processes of regulatory and economic convergence 
support the idea of a political and economic liberalisation of international migration governance.  
Yet in the Gulf, these processes of liberalisation have led to little effective protection for immigrants 
(rights-based liberalism) and have not given more autonomy to markets and economic actors (market-
based liberalism). On the contrary, I argue that migration governance has taken a sovereign turn in the 
Gulf. States have sought to enhance their direct and indirect control over immigration using 
contingent policies and structural reforms. Such processes are aimed at limiting the agency of 
markets, brokers, and immigrant networks both through immigration policies — the selection and 
admission of migrants, border control, visa requirements, deportation, expulsion, and return — and 
immigrant policies – conditions of residence, stay and integration, and socioeconomic rights (Hammar 
1985, 7-9).  
This paper unpacks the politics of migration governance in the six GCC countries since the early 
2000s, looking at both the international and domestic “levels” of the immigration policy game 
(Putnam 1988) to explain how this sovereign turn happened in the specific context of the six oil 
rentier states. While recent comparative studies have tried to demonstrate why migration policies are 
“open” or “liberal” in dictatorships (Mirilovic 2010) or rentier states (Shin 2017) using policy indexes 
and migration numbers, they fall short of accounting for variations in migrant numbers and origins 
across time and explaining how governments operate in contexts where ruling and economic elites’ 
interests intersect or collide. By looking at the international politics of Gulf immigration and their 
domestic roots, this article brings seemingly exotic case studies into central debates on the role of 
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states in migration politics. To do so, it adopts a qualitative empirical stance, relying on sources in 
English and Arabic and ten years of ethnographic fieldwork in the region. 1  
At the international level, I show how immigrant selection and selective deportations are channelled 
through both security-oriented policies and new public-private partnerships in migration diplomacies. 
I particularly examine diplomatic struggles between sending and receiving states around immigrants’ 
rights and wages. These struggles have only brought symbolic changes in migrants’ legal leverage and 
protection, but they have enhanced both sending and receiving states’ control over migration flows. I 
describe such outcomes as “migrant rights-washing.”  
At the domestic level, I show how governments increasingly tried to police labour markets and the 
mesostructures of migration governance (Faist 1997), such as recruiters and brokers. I find that mass 
labour import and new labour laws go hand in hand with illiberal regulations and practices that limit 
migrants’ autonomy and reinforce intersectional discriminations across nationalities and class. I argue 
that labour reforms therefore tend to institutionalise migrants’ differential exclusion rather than 
improve integration and protection. 
This paper engages with two central debates in the literature on migration politics. 
Firstly, it contributes to the discussion around sovereignty in migration governance, an issue generally 
studied in democratic and liberal contexts (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Hollifield and Wong 2013; 
Joppke 2007). It thus fills a gap in research on migration politics in the Global South that usually 
focuses on emigration countries and diaspora policies and underestimates the role of immigration 
policies (Weiner 1985, 450), sometimes even denying the very existence of such policies (Brochmann 
and Hammar 1999, 12). Governance processes2 under study here are taking place in contexts where 
boundaries between public and private actors are often analytically blurred and where states are 
deemed particularly porous to the interests of ruling families who are also business actors. The 
country’s resources and economy are often said to be managed by “private governments” (Ayubi 
1995, 229) and markets are sometimes considered as “appendix to the state” (Hertog 2013, 175). My 
argument, however, seeks to question classical, patrimonial frameworks3 or ad hoc clientelist 
 
1 This research relies on demographic data, media, and administrative and policy documents in English and 
Arabic, as well as ethnographic fieldwork. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Saudi Arabia in 2006, 
2013, 2015, and 2017 with government officials, employers, and recruiters, as well as immigrants from various 
origins (N=57) in Riyadh and Jeddah in 2006, 2015, and 2017.  
2 This article focuses on governance processes understood as “how [global] outcomes are produced and how 
actors are differentially enabled and constrained” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 3-4). 
3 In rentier states, ruling elites are considered to uphold a joint authority over economic and political spheres and 
use redistributive policies and kinship solidarity combined with ideological and religious control, with 
occasional repression . Rent-dependent regimes classically hybridise authoritarian, state-based monarchical rule 
with patronage networks channelled through ethnic kinship (tribes and extended family, or ‘â’ila) and trading 
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bargaining between governments and businesses (Freeman 1995) or contention between governments 
and courts (Joppke 2001). It explains how immigrants are allowed in and what kind of rights they are 
(not) provided with. The sovereign turn observed in the Gulf, however, resonates in many other 
contexts, including Western ones (Joppke 2007). This trend not only challenges the global 
“disaggregation of authority” (Rosenau 1995) or the notion of (self)limited sovereignty in liberal 
democracies (Joppke 2007) but also the idea of a structurally “limited statehood” in non-Western 
contexts (Risse 2013). As such, this piece goes beyond simple dichotomies between state-centred or 
nonstate approaches (Barnett and Duvall 2004; Gamlen and Marsh 2012) or Western and non-
Western migration policies (Diamant 1959; Natter 2018).  
Secondly, a general ambition of this piece is to describe the often-forgotten illiberal structures4 of 
global migration governance and bring large immigration countries of the Gulf into the discussion of 
migration politics.5 A largely Western-centric literature usually frames migration governance as 
driven by rights-enhancing and market-based mechanisms.6 In this context, “illiberal processes” of 
migration governance (immigration limitation, deportation, migrants’ selection on a non-labour-
related basis, rights deprivation, etc.) are usually conceptualised as policy failures and implementation 
gaps (Czaika and de Haas 2013) or exotic exceptions. In fact, existing immigration policy indexes 
usually exclude Gulf monarchies (Bjerre et al. 2015), as well as most Southern immigration countries, 
in spite of their empirical relevance.7 This paper argues that illiberal migration governance in the 
GCC cannot be conceptualised as an “implementation gap” diverging from global liberal trends. I 
show that migration governance is actually driven by security concerns and designed to enhance 
states’ control over market processes, the transnational migration industry (defined by Gammeltoft-
Hansen and Sørensen 2013), and migrants’ networks. As such, the Gulf offers a novel take on illiberal 
migration governance as a political project and a set of practices that are not limited to undemocratic 
 
families (Beblawi and Luciani 1987). Political arrangements and power configurations between tribal elites, 
ruling dynasties, and important merchant families vary across countries and over time. See for Saudi Arabia 
(Chaudhry 1997; Hertog 2010), for Kuwait (Herb2014). 
4 “Governance structures” refer to both institutions and practices (Behrend and Whitehead 2016).  
5 The Gulf is mostly absent from reference books on international migration politics and global migration 
governance or migration theories (Brettell and Hollifield 2008). At best, the Gulf countries are singled out as 
outliers (Castles et al. 2013) or exceptional (Fargues and de Bel-Air 2015) and mostly feature in area-specific 
research (Khalaf et al. 2015; Luciani and Salamé 1988).  
6 The phrase “migration governance” is hardly ever used to describe how migration is managed in undemocratic 
and illiberal contexts, focusing on processes happening across and within liberal democracies (see for instance 
Kunz et al. 2011). Authors have recently attempted to bring into scholarly debates non-Western cases like 
Singapore (Koh et al. 2017) and South Africa (Klotz 2013).  
7 The GCC countries are the third-largest migrant-receiving region in the world after North America and the 
European Union (UNDESA, Population Division 2017). They host the highest proportion of foreigners, and 
most Gulf immigrants come from developing countries. All three characteristics make them crucial to 
understanding the governance of South-South migration, which composes the majority of flows today (Abel and 
Sander 2014).  Few recent studies have included some or all GCC countries in policy index-based analyses 
(Mirilovic 2010; Peters 2015; Ruhs 2017; Shin 2017). 
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contexts.8 Even if migration policies are more open in the Gulf and more restrictive in OECD 
countries (Beine et al. 2016), since the 1990s, policies have become more discriminatory across 
migrant categories in both OECD countries (de Haas et al. 2018; Mau et al. 2015) and in the GCC. 
Rather than outliers or exceptions, the GCC countries can thus open a discussion around converging 
trends of illiberal migration governance.  
  
 
8 I adopt a broad understanding of “illiberal” beyond a “human rights problem” (Glasius and Michaelsen 2018) 
or a regime issue (Er 1999), adding a market-based dimension to it but converging with analyses that find 
illiberal practices in both undemocratic and democratic contexts (Behrend and Whitehead 2016). 
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1 Liberal decoys: More immigrants from more diverse origins with 
more rights?  
1.1 A second immigration boom 
Immigration flows to the Gulf have been massive since the 1970s, and the variations displayed in 
Figure 1 show a strong correlation between oil prices and net migration rates9 after the OPEC-led oil 
embargo against the United States in 1973. Echoing the peaks of both commodity prices and 
immigration flows of the 1970s, the region experienced a second immigration boom in the 2000s that 
also correlated with rising oil prices. The immigrant population in the GCC went from 8 to 10 million 
from 1990 to 2000, then jumped to 20 million in 2010 and 25 million in 2015 (UNDESA, Population 
Division 2017). 
Figure 1: Average net migration rates per thousand (‰) of inhabitants in the GCC (left axis) and Oil 
prices in 2016 USD (right axis) from 1950 to 2015. 
  
Source: UNDESA, Population Division 2015. 
 
Focusing on commodity prices related to labour demands, many experts interested in Gulf migration 
 
9 Net migration rates capture migration flows through the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants 
as a ratio of the local population and are calculated per thousand of inhabitants.  
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have underestimated the role of political variables in determining the magnitude and nature of 
immigration. Many have described the politics of migration governance as “open door” (Fasano and 
Iqbal 2003), “liberal migration policies” (Feiler 1991, 147), “liberal and nonselective migration 
policies” (Winckler 1997, 483) or laissez-faire approach (Richards and Martin 1983) emphasising the 
oil/migration dependency through historical, qualitative, and quantitative analysis (Birks et al. 1986; 
Jones 2010; Naufal 2015; Winckler 2017, 116-159).  
1.2 The globalisation of migration flows 
Furthermore, immigration became more “global” around the 1990s. If migrants were mainly coming 
from neighbouring Arab countries up to the late 1980s, in the 1990s most came from Asia and 
particularly from India, which represented 32 percent of all foreigners in the region in 2015 (Figure 
2). Asian workers are often said to have “replaced” Arab workers (mostly for unskilled labour) 
because they were “cheaper” in an era of decreasing oil revenue (Kapiszewski 2006, 9) although the 
shift is critically discussed in the literature as a political one (Choucri 1986; Fargues2000; Humphrey 
et al. 1991; Thiollet 2011). The geography of migration networks changed in the 1990s, globalising 
Gulf migration and feeding diverse ethnic economies in the GCC. Although they did not “replace” 
Arab workers, Asian immigrants who staffed mostly low-skill sectors in the 2000s (Girgis 2002) came 
to also occupy semi- and skilled jobs in the 2010s (Gulf Business 2017). Shops and restaurants opened 
to cater for their needs, creating ethnic economies in these new “global cities” (Elsheshtawy 2010). 
Figure 2: Number of immigrants in the GCC by main regions of origin in 201510  
 
Source: UNDESA, Population Division 2015. 
 
 
10 Asian countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey. Arab countries include Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
African countries include Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan. “Northern” countries include 
USA, France, Netherlands, UK, Other North. 
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1.3 Rights-based international cooperation and domestic 
reforms 
In the early 2000s, Gulf governments engaged in South-South cooperation around migration issues 
through bilateral and sectorial agreements with Arab11 and Asian countries.12 At the multilateral level, 
the Abu Dhabi Dialogue initiated in 2008 sought to “improve the governance of labour migration in 
the Asia-Gulf corridor” through “non-binding regional consultative processes”13 under the auspices of 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
In the late 2000s, Gulf governments adopted discourses and initiated reforms in favour of rights-based 
labour migration governance (Khan and Harroff-Tavel 2011). Reforms often concerned the 
sponsorship system or kafala (al-Jazeera 2015),14 widely criticised by human rights activists (Human 
Rights Watch 2010), sending states like the Philippines (Aben 2018), and scholars alike. The kafala is 
often considered the main source of exploitative practices in labour migration and the main cause of 
migrant abuses, as it generates situations of “unfree labour” (Longva 1999). New legislation was 
introduced in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to allow workers to change jobs without their kufala’ 
or employers’ authorisation (under conditions), but it the kafala as a whole was only suppressed in 
Bahrain in 2009.  
 
2 The realpolitik of numbers: Unpacking migration diplomacies 
The ethnic or national selection of immigrants signals security concerns of immigration states (Weiner 
1993) and offers an indicator of illiberal and racialised migration policies both for proponents of the 
liberal convergence thesis in Europe (Joppke 2005) and for its adversaries in the Americas 
(FitzGerald and Cook-Martín 2014). To shape the volume and composition of flows (migrant 
selection), Gulf governments use not only coercive diplomacy and formal cooperation with sending 
states but also domestic labour regulations to police transnational networks of chain migration. 
 
11 See for instance in the UAE, Federal Decree No. 45 on Regulating the Recruitment and Employment of 
Syrian Workers made between the United Arab Emirates and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in 
2009 and Federal Decree No. 92 on the ratification of the Convention for the Cooperation in the Field of 
Manpower Between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Jordan in 2007, and a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Nepal in the Field of Manpower 
the same year. 
12 See for instance in Saudi Arabia, the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 68 (Sri Lanka) and Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 19 (Philippines) regarding the bilateral agreement for the recruitment of domestic 
workers signed in 2014. 
13 See “About Abu Dhabi Dialogue” on the official website, http://abudhabidialogue.org.ae/about-abu-dhabi-
dialogue.  
14 Immigration and migrants’ lives are legally dependent on sponsors (singular Kafil, plural kufala’) that may or 
may not be a migrant’s employer. Intermediation is required for migrants’ entry and exit, hiring and laying off, 
job changes, residence rights, family reunion, and business investment, all in exchange for fees.  
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Retaliatory migration diplomacies most famously have impacted Arab immigration in 1991 and again 
in 2011, but they also feature in Arab-Asian relations. The recent evolutions have generated little 
research in international studies contrary to the 1970s-80s (Ibrahim 1982; Shafik1998; Thiollet 2011).  
2.1 Targeted deportations 
Selective immigration and deportation policies unveil the use of migrants as leverage in foreign policy 
(Thiollet 2011; Tsourapas 2018), particularly in times of crises. All induced extreme changes in the 
volume of immigration, as observed in Figure 1, but also in its composition. The often-cited historical 
example of such policies is the mass deportation of Arab migrants from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
during the 1991 Gulf War (Van Hear 1998).15 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia retaliated against Palestinian 
and Yemeni residents because of the explicit or implicit support granted to the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh. In both 
cases, administrative constraints on immigration and residence were arbitrarily changed for specific 
categories of migrants. In Kuwait, Palestinians’ residence permits were cancelled or not renewed, 
state-owned firms laid off Palestinian employees, and those who had left the country before the 
invasion were forbidden to return. In Saudi Arabia, Yemenis were the main expatriate community in 
the country when a royal decree ended the exemption of sponsorship requirement they enjoyed and 
more than 800,000 had to leave. 
Foreign policy again accounts for Saudi Arabia’s mass expulsions of Yemenis in 2011. Yemenis were 
the primary targets of “correction” campaigns undertaken by the Saudi government against irregular 
immigrants. Expulsions came as a retaliation against the Iran-supported Houthi government that took 
power in Sanaa in 2013 and as a way to shatter the Yemeni economy and society with mass returns 
and a remittances downfall. Between June 2013 and November 2014, 613,473 Yemenis were expelled 
and deportations continued, with Yemenis composing up to 65 percent of the deported in 2017 
(McKernan 2018). Yemenis also came under acute police surveillance, notably in Riyadh, Jeddah, and 
in the border cities of Jizan, Abha, and Najran.16 In the UAE, targeted deportation concerned Shia 
Lebanese in 2015 in the wake of the political condemnation of Hezbollah (Khalil 2015). Kuwait 
deployed campaigns against irregular migration in 2011 and in 2015, with over 100,000 foreigners 
apprehended each time; actual deportations were unevenly implemented, more harshly against Syrians 
(Shah 2014, 7) than against the majority of irregular residents (Bangladeshis and Egyptians). With 
routinely organised crackdowns on irregular immigrants, police raids and actual deportations often 
combined security and administrative motives in a context where informality was generally tolerated. 
Interviews with public officials acknowledge the limited impact of deportations on irregular migration 
 
15 The composition of immigrant communities varies across countries, and Saudi Arabia retained or 
reincorporated sizable proportions of Arab immigrants after 1991, contrary to Kuwait (Girgis 2002). 
16 Interviews with Yemeni migrants, Jeddah, November 2017. 
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but emphasise their use as a signal of state control.17 
2.2 Selective labour import: Managing migration 
interdependence  
Saudi ministry officials in the early 2000s underplayed the role governmental policies play in migrant 
selection: “The private sector decides the nationality of workers, not the ministry of labour. The 
market decides (…) and the chambers of commerce operate the recruitments,” said a high-ranking 
official of the Saudi Ministry of Labour in 2006. He added, “We do not have specific arrangements 
with any country. (…) We don’t even know how many Arabs and Asians are here. We have our 
labour law and that’s all we need.”18  
An African diplomat interviewed in 2006 explained that “the embassy in Riyadh and the consulate in 
Jeddah did not interfere with the migration process and had as little intervention as possible in the 
recruitment and sponsorship dynamics.”19  
In fact, no evidence can be found of “visa policies” selecting immigrants by nationality, but as a Saudi 
academic summarised, “There is no immigration policy in Saudi Arabia,” but there are “hidden 
politics” of migration that “have to do with international politics.”20 These “hidden politics” translated 
into both international cooperation and public-private arrangements.   
From the 1960s to the 1980s, migration from Arab countries — notably Egypt — was perceived as a 
vector of Pan-Arab integration (Shafik 1998) and supported for political motives (Fargues 2000; 
Thiollet 2011). In the 1990s, migration interdependence (Hollifield and Faruk 2017; Tsourapas 2018) 
with Arab states came to be seen as a threatening form of “dependency.” Arab immigrants who were 
well connected to host societies came to be seen as a growing threat to local rulers (Chalcraft 2011), 
as opposed to “disenfranchised” or “quiet” South Asians who would not unsettle local regimes 
(Choucri 1986, 252; Weiner 1982, 3). South Asian migrants were also seen as more easily 
“controlled” and expendable (Humphrey et al. 1991, 47). Asian immigration, however, created new 
cultural and existential “threats” (officials' quotes cited by Kapiszewski 2006, 8) in a context of rising 
discourses on khaleeji (Gulf) and national identities (Dresch and Piscatori 2013). Thus, concerns for 
political influence of certain groups of Arab immigrants blended into the overall fear of the 
“demographic imbalance” between foreigners and nationals (Al-Shehabi 2014).  
 
17 Interviews with members of the Majlis ash-Shura and officials from the Ministry of Labour, Riyadh and 
Jeddah, 2015. 
18 Interview, Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, 2006. 
19 Interview, Eritrean embassy, Riyadh, 2006. 
20 Interview, Riyadh, 2006. 
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In Saudi Arabia, a “10 percent” rule was informally established in the 1990s by the Manpower 
Council (abolished in 2004): the agency tried to impose that no single nationality would represent 
more than 10 percent of the total foreign population but failed to enforce the limitation.21  
In the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, English was introduced alongside Arabic in the early 2000s as a 
language of instruction from secondary levels onwards, which accelerated the recruitment of English-
speaking Indian and Pakistani academics instead of Egyptian and other Arab-speaking nationalities. If 
such policies did not prevent Arab immigrants from staying in the UAE, they clearly limited the 
opportunities of new immigrants from Egypt or Lebanon to migrate (Assaf 2017; Gruntz 2014), 
inducing changes in the cumulative composition of immigrant communities or chain migration. 
Fieldwork conducted in 2017 among Pakistani taxi drivers in Riyadh22 illustrates the impact of state 
policies in a sector where the migrants had acquired quite a degree of autonomy and even leverage 
due to a quasi-monopoly on the urban transportation industry. In 2017, over 10,000 Pakistanis formed 
a majority of Riyadh’s taxi drivers,23 most of them from Peshawar and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(PKP) province (“Patan”). Chain migration was organised since the 1960s by small entrepreneurs and 
drivers in the transportation industry back in PKP. Similar to other migrant workers in low-paid 
service sectors in the GCC, they hardly ever bring their families with them although they often stay in 
Saudi Arabia for decades, maintaining transnational lives with families back home. Official 
limitations were imposed in 2012 on hiring foreigners for two main private chauffeur services, Uber 
and Careem, in the context of Nitaqat programmes designed to promote nationals’ employment. 
Drivers interviewed considered new Patan immigration has decreased since 2013. Informal networks 
could not provide official migration documentations “as before.” and drivers had to transfer their 
work and residence permits to large companies. Further interviews with Pakistani diplomats in Riyadh 
unveiled a significant rise in official implications in migration management for the second-largest 
migrant community in the country, notably in the context of “correction campaigns” launched against 
irregular migrants.24  
2.3 States and the immigration industry  
As mentioned earlier, immigrant selection qualifies as “hidden politics” as governments push for 
more indirect control over private actors via “arm’s length public bodies” or public-private 
partnerships. But contrary to the dynamics of devolution in Western democracies, “delegated 
governance” (Denton and Flinders 2006) in the Gulf actually empowers states instead of externalising 
 
21 Interview, Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, 2006. 
22 Interviews (N=17) conducted in Riyadh, November 2017. 
23 Interview with government officials at the Pakistani embassy and Saudi Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, 
November 2017. 
24 Interviews, Pakistani embassy, Riyadh, 2017. 
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sovereign control to private intermediaries. Business-government coalitions in migration management 
appear less surprising in patrimonial contexts than the “strange bedfellows” analysed in the United 
States (Freeman 1995; Zolberg 2008). However, beyond extended ruling families (kinship 
corporatism) or prominent merchant/tribal elites (Hanieh 2011), new institutions and formal public-
private partnerships were crafted in the 2000s.  
In Saudi Arabia, the position of Deputy Minister for International Affairs was created in 2013 
specifically to manage the increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding labour 
import.25 The deputy minister, however, explains, “The government does not want to enter into 
political relations with emigrating countries, and the chambers of commerce and their recruitment 
committees (Lijân al-Istiqdâm) are foreign governments’ counterparts so that the Saudi government is 
neither legally responsible nor politically involved.”26 Still mentioning “self-regulated labour 
markets,” public officials in 2015 more openly defended state-led migration control. Multilateral 
negotiations crafting migration agreements in the 2010s “embedded” members of the recruitment 
committees of chambers of commerce, but the committees were structurally put under state control 
with the inclusion of representatives of the chambers and the ministries of Labour and Interior after a 
reform of the Council of Saudi Chambers in 2013.27  
In 2013, the Saudi government reformed the recruitment sector and limited the number of firms 
operating transnationally to better control the private dynamics of labour import to the country, with 
echoes in sending countries. 28 The Ministry of Labour introduced a system of licensing to foster the 
emergence of mega firms. Aiming at “cleaning up” the recruitment sector,29 they made the industry 
formally state dependent. 
The CEO of a large recruitment firm described the role of businessmen as “key mediators in 
migration diplomacy”: he participated in the negotiations on minimum wages with Indonesia.30 
However, he emphasised the ever-growing government control over the transnational recruitment 
business,  notably with the state licensing of recruitment firms. Given his “connections to government 
officials,” he obtained one of the few licences distributed by the Saudi ministry in 2013, whereas they 
were denied to other prominent businessmen. His experience illustrates porous boundaries between 
private and public spheres typical of rentier polities but also echoes the increasingly formalised state 
 
25 Interview with the Deputy Minister of International Affairs, Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, 2015. 
26 Interview, Chamber of Commerce, Jeddah, 2006. 
27 Interview, Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce, Riyadh, 2013. 
28 In 2016, the Indian government started to channel migrant recruitment to six state-run recruitment agencies 
for nurses and domestic workers. Similarly, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) 
controls transnational recruitment agencies with offices both in origin and receiving countries in the Gulf 
through a licencing process that strictly enforces migrant and wage control (POEA 2018). 
29 Interviews, Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, 2015. 
30 Interviews, Riyadh, 2015. 
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control of the transnational recruitment sector,31 thus structuring an illiberal transnationalism (Thiollet 
2017).  
States and the migration industry operate along a continuum that can blur the public-private 
distinction as described in classical studies  (Harney 1979; Lahav 1998). As Gulf business actors 
gained political momentum in the 1990s (Hertog 2013), reforms in the recruitment sector and labour 
market institutions were aimed at enhancing states’ structural power (Barnett and Duvall 2004) 
beyond rentierism and patrimonial relations. 
 
3 The international politics of wages and rights 
International cooperation and diplomatic struggles around migrant rights and wages between Gulf and 
Asian governments in the 2000s illustrate the political engagement of both sending and receiving 
states in migration governance. Paradoxically, they yielded little liberal outcomes for immigrants but 
actually changed power relations between Asian sending countries and the GCC as well as between 
governments and nonstate actors.  
3.1 Rights and wages: Issue linkage in migration 
governance 
In the past decade, emigration countries like India and the Philippines developed emigration and 
diaspora policies to both protect and control emigrants and secure large inflows of remittances. Asian 
states have repeatedly used “migration bans” against Gulf monarchies, as a way to flex their muscles 
in multilateral migration governance. In 2011, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia engaged in diplomatic arm 
wrestling over migrant maids. The Indonesian government announced a ban on emigration of female 
domestic workers to protest the beheading of a maid, which was only formally lifted in 2013. The 
Saudi government immediately retaliated, in turn banning all labour migration from Indonesia. A 
similar ban was imposed from 2015 to 2018 to the Gulf countries and other Middle Eastern 
destinations, with little effect but the increase of irregular migration. Similar diplomatic 
confrontations pitted the Philippines against Saudi Arabia in 2011 after the Filipino government 
imposed a minimum wage policy for their nationals, and Kuwait in 2016.  Bans sometimes turn into 
more permanent constraints. In 2012, the Indian government banned migration for females under age 
 
31 He founded his company in the 1980s to recruit workers from Indonesia. He became the head of the Saudi-
Indonesian recruitment committee for the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, and, as Indonesian migration 
increased, he ended up heading the chamber’s recruitment committee that oversees all bilateral committees’ 
activities. He later served as chair for the recruitment committees at the Council of Saudi Chambers. Interviews, 
Riyadh, 2013 and 2015. 
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thirty to the Gulf countries which were already listed as Emigration Check Required countries under 
the Emigration Act of 1983. Nepal did so the same year. Rather than dilemmas of “promotion or 
protection” mentioned by Ruhs (2013, 138-144), I argue that sending countries impose “issue 
linkage” between migrants rights and wages in their diplomatic bargaining and muscle flexing. 
During these crises, the defence of Gulf migrants’ civil and labour rights was often tied to 
negotiations on wages by sending countries. The Gulf had become the largest source of transfer to 
Asia in a very short period of time,32 providing USD 72 billion of USD 98 billion in remittances 
(World Bank 2016). 
Emigration countries used criminal cases against migrants and migrant abuse to increase their 
pressure on economic issues, notably on demands regarding minimum wages. Issue linkages between 
rights and wages feature as a key tactic of Asian states’ migration diplomacy in the 2010s. In 2016, 
the Philippines threatened to ban emigration of domestic workers to Kuwait after the murder of a 
maid and used the pressure to bargain in favour of minimum wages for Filipino maids (at KWD 120 
or USD 400 per month). The Kuwaiti parliament yielded and became the first Arab country to 
introduce a minimum wage for domestic workers at KWD 60 or USD 200 per month (State of Kuwait 
2016). However, bilateral negotiations between the Filipino Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Kuwait for a minimum monthly salary of KWD 120 for Filipino domestic workers succeeded in 
March 2018 under pressure of another ban imposed by Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte. The 
Philippines had already used the threat of a ban to negotiate a bilateral agreement on maids’ wages 
with Saudi Arabia in 2012 despite strong reluctance from the Saudi government and business 
community. The Indonesian embassy in Abu Dhabi managed to impose a minimum wage of AED 
1,400 or USD 380  on recruitment companies for Indonesian housemaids based on “experience” in the 
UAE in the context of the overall ban on Indonesian female immigration to the Emirates 
(Sebugwaawo 2018). Home governments of large migrant communities and their embassies 
sometimes thus manage to negotiate minimum wages for their nationals either by pressuring or 
directly regulating recruitment companies.  
These differential minimum-wage policies by nationality turn the de facto segmentation of Gulf 
labour markets into a state-endorsed institution. The market hierarchises categories of migrant 
workers across nationalities. Wage inequalities tend to be particularly visible in low-skilled and care 
jobs but also show in skilled jobs as a regional survey documents.33 Eritrean “maids” I met in Riyadh 
repeatedly lamented the poor “value” they had on the market compared to Filipino maids because of 
 
32 Official remittances from the GCC to the Philippines rocketed from almost zero to over USD 3 billion 
between 1990 and 2011 (Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas 2017). 
33 In 2017, a retail bank manager for instance earned an average monthly wage of USD 8,918 if he/she were 
“Arab,” USD 6,846 if he/she were “Asian,” and USD 10,747 if he/she were “Western.” (Gulf Business 2017). 
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racial prejudices and social prestige attached to them.34 A wealthy Pakistani family lamented that as 
highly specialised doctors employed in a private hospital they earned less than their Saudi or Western 
colleagues of equal skills. But they paid their new Filipino maid more than their previous Indonesian 
one.35 Wage gaps translate into hard currency the socially constructed hierarchies between 
nationalities, often conflating nationality and race to operate a racialisation of labour markets 
(Jureidini 2003). The moral economies of racialised labour markets are widely accepted and 
reproduced by employees and employers, migrants and nonmigrants. They translate into policies 
through the negotiated minimum wages, thus officialising a racialised labour migration governance.  
3.2 Migrant rights-washing: Public diplomacy and migrant 
control 
International cooperation around migration governance aligned with the general ambition of Gulf 
states and cities like Dubai, Abu Dhabi, or Doha, to fully participate in international society, develop 
their “soft power” along international liberal norms (Hertog 2019), and diversify their economies. 
Gulf states sought to host world events in politics, sports, and arts and developed public diplomacies 
around those megaevents.36 The intense pressure exerted by international nongovernment 
organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs) in these contexts has fostered novel albeit 
limited legal commitments on behalf of immigrant rights as the case of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in 
Qatar illustrates (Ratcliffe 2018). In the run-up to its selection, the Qatari state sought to improve its 
dismal labour-conditions records by creating a wage protection system (WPS) in 2015 and a National 
Human Rights Committee. Featured on the official website “illoveqatar.net” are quotes from human 
rights NGO websites that support the message that the state is addressing critiques through the WPS. 
The official website also offers online forms to file complaints,37 but the record of implementation 
remains low, according to human rights organisations (Amnesty International 2019).  
International conventions were adopted in the 1990s and 2000s but were often signed and not ratified, 
or they excluded migrant workers from the provisions adopted, which amounted to excluding a 
majority of their labour force. 38 More importantly and besides implementation gaps, new legal 
instruments adopted domestically sought to foster migration control ahead of migrant protection.  
The UAE, which reformed its social insurance system and labour regulations concerning foreigners 
 
34 Interviews, Riyadh, 2006 and 2015. 
35 Interviews, Riyadh, 2017. 
36 Dubai won the bid for the 2020 World Exposition, Qatar for the 2022 World Cup after organising the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC COP) 18 conference. 
37 See “How Qatar's Wage Protection System works for you” published on May 1, 2018 at 
https://www.iloveqatar.net/news/general/wages-protection-system-wps [accessed May 7, 2019]. 
38 See NORMLEX database of the ILO: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:1: [accessed 
May 7, 2019]. 
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between 2005 and 2007, passed a federal law (Federal Law No. 51) to combat trafficking in 2006 that 
established a National Committee for Combating Trafficking. The law aims to better control 
foreigners through registration and monitoring, in particular “absconding” workers (who leave their 
jobs without the employer’s authorisation), and limits the possibility of strikes. On the protection side, 
the committee reported a very limited number of trafficking cases across the Emirates (10 in 2008, 20 
in 2009, 43 in 2009, 58 in 2010, 37 in 2011, 47 in 2012, 19 in 2013, 15 in 2014, and 17 in 2015), and 
charges concerned mostly foreign employers (National Committee 2015). In 2013 and 2015, Saudi 
Arabia also introduced amendments to the Labour Law, including fines for employers who violate 
regulations, keep employees’ passports, or do not pay workers. But the new labour courts in charge of 
implementing a decade of reforms were only established in November 2018 and their efficacy was 
questioned by human right activists (Migrants-rights.org 2019). 
The few migrant-led mobilisations that emerged in the Gulf in the 2000s both illustrated the hope for 
more rights-based governance on behalf of migrant workers and the limits of reforms. Marches and 
strikes organised by migrants in Kuwait (2005), Dubai (2007-2008), and Saudi Arabia (2016) in the 
construction and health sectors made visible the often-silenced claims of low-skilled workers 
(Chalcraft 2011, 50). Some claims were successful in courts, as in the case of the 31,000 complaints 
about unpaid wages by construction firm Oger in Saudi Arabia in 2016. But wage payment failed to 
take place, and deportation procedures were implemented against laid-off plaintiffs with the help of 
foreign embassies (Reuters 2016). Newspapers in the Gulf regularly report the jailing and deportation 
of striking foreign workers. Interviews conducted in 2017 among immigrants confirm that courts are 
not deemed to offer credible protection against employers’ abuses despite recent reforms. 
On the reform agenda, migrant protection therefore lags behind control and repression. State control 
has increased on entries and exits, for example through biometric visas introduced in 2009 in the UAE 
and brutal campaigns of deportation against irregular migrants. Labour law mainstreaming only paid 
lip service to international labour and human rights conventions (Keane and McGeehan 2008) but 
enhanced states’ capacity for migration control. 
 
4 Policing labour markets and brokering control 
In the 2000s, mass labour import conjoined with reforms and policies that severely restrained —
formally and in practice —- the autonomy of migrants while often pretending to enhance labour 
rights. Reforms have formally “brought the state” into migration governance through policing 
practices that reinforced discrimination between migrants and nationals and among migrants. 
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4.1 Policing labour market segmentation  
Wage discrimination between nationals and migrants and among migrants is common across contexts 
(Portes and Zhou 1993), but how do states intervene in the mesostructures of segmented labour 
markets? 
Gulf governments historically used legal instruments, such as the “nationality clause,” to promote 
nationals’ employment in foreign oil companies in the 1930s (Errichiello 2012). In the 1990s, 
governments started to intervene directly and indirectly to institutionalise the national/migrant 
distinction. Their involvement varies across countries, as do the “arrangements” through which states 
partner with migration industries based on the degree of formality and profit (Surak 2018). 
Governments most famously introduced nationalisation policies (“Emiratisation”, “Saudisation” etc.) 
that promoted the employment of citizens. These policies aimed to restructure labour market 
segmentation between migrants and nonmigrants: nationals who were predominantly in the private 
sector prior to the 1990s started to enrol as public servants staffing plethoric state services, while 
foreign workers were progressively banned from accessing public employment. Migrants mostly work 
in the private sector, where nationals are underrepresented if not quasi absent (see Table 1: Share of 
nationals and migrants in the labour force by GCC country). They are present across skill levels in all 
subsectors of activities but are overwhelmingly represented in low-skilled jobs. The 1990s thus 
permitted the institutionalisation of an exclusionary regime that separates migrants and nonmigrants 
legally and practically, severely limits naturalisation, reserves free access to socioeconomic benefits 
and public services (education, health) for nationals, and uses public sector jobs as a vector of rent 
redistribution.39  
 
39 Exclusionary policies against migrants are combined with discriminatory policies and practices against 
nationals along tribal, ethnic, religious, and gender identities across the Gulf, as shown in policies for Shia 
citizens (Matthiesen 2013), women (Le Renard 2018), or stateless residents (Beaugrand 2017). 
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Table 1: Share of nationals and migrants in the labour force by GCC country  
 
Percent of 
nationals in 
the private 
sector 
Percent of 
migrants in the 
private sector 
Percent 
of nationals in 
the public sector 
Percent  
of migrants in 
the public sector 
Bahrain (2018) 17.3 82.7 84.5 15.5 
Kuwait (2015) 4.1 95.9 70.5 29.5 
Oman  (2014) 10.9 89.1 85.8 14.2 
Saudi Arabia (2017) 18.7 81.3 94.9 5.1 
Qatar (2016)  1.1* 99.4* 31.2* 63.8* 
United Arab Emirates (2017) 9.1* 87.6* 83.7* 8.0* 
Source: National statistics (author's compilation).40 
Nationalisation policies resurfaced in the 2000s as a core component of migration governance.41 
Governments created national human resources agencies and renamed ministries as the “Ministry of 
Human Resources and Emiratisation” in the UAE and the “Human Resource Development Fund” 
(HRDF) in 2000 in Saudi Arabia. In the Emirates, nationals working in private companies are assured 
 
40 Definitions of the public and private sectors vary across countries. For Qatar and the UAE, the asterisk (*) 
signals that the total excludes workers in “other” categories. 
Bahrain. Source: Table A. Estimated total employment by citizenship and sector: 2007-2018,” Labour Market 
Regulatory Authority, accessed November 2, 2019, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/data/lmr/Table_A.pdf. Note: 
For data from 2004 to 2018 and complete labour force data, see “Bahrain Labour Market Indicators,” Labour 
Market Regulatory Authority, accessed November 2, 2019, http://blmi.lmra.bh/2018/06/mi_data.xml. 
Kuwait. Source: Public Authority for Civil Information, Data for 2015 - Table 14-15, released 2016, 
https://www.paci.gov.kw/stat/. Note: Statistics separate government, nongovernment, and domestic work. 
Nonnationals may include bidoon (stateless) population. 
Oman. Source: National Center for Statistics and Information (website), 
https://www.ncsi.gov.om/Elibrary/LibraryContentDoc/bar_workers%20in%20Oman_8c53b1dc-2672-4de6-
819a-d76c7ab4c850.pdf. Note: See also labour force survey in Arabic, p. 21 for 2010 (excludes domestic 
workers, only percentages are given). 
Saudi Arabia. Source: Labour Market Survey 3rd quarter of 2017: data based on registration as civil service 
(public) vs social insurance + domestic workers: private, General Authority for Statistics. 
Qatar. Source: Labour Force Survey 2016, Ministry of Development Planning Statistics, accessed November 2, 
2019,  
https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Social/LaborForce/2016/labor_force_statistical_a
nalysis_2016_En.pdf. Note: The total does not include workers employed in “other” sectors. 
United Arab Emirates. Source: Labour force survey Table 10: percentages of employed nationals and migrants 
in private sector (private sector, foreign, nonprofit organisations, without establishment + domestic workers 
employed in private households) and public sector (local and federal government, shared: government and 
private: foreign, diplomatic authority) and private household and others,” Federal Competitiveness and 
Statistical Authority,  http://fcsa.gov.ae/en-us/Pages/Statistics/Statistics-by-Subject.aspx. Note: The total does 
not include workers employed in “other” sectors. 
41 See for Bahrain (Louer 2008). 
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the same social security benefits as in government-sector companies. In Saudi Arabia, Taqat 
programmes partly designed by foreign consultants were implemented in 2011 and include extremely 
large wage subsidies for nationals. Initially designed as temporary measures, HRDF increasingly 
subsidises newly hired employed Saudis “to replace foreigners” in the private sector.42 As a 
complement, governments increased the level of taxation on foreign workers by raising residence 
permit (Iqama) fees and fees on changes to kafil and work permits, as well as taxing companies that 
fail to adjust to the required level of nationals in their staff stipulated in the Nitaqat programme. 
Economic incentives, combined with and financial and legal constraints at the firm level, aim to 
compensate for the nationals-expat wage gap and change labour market dynamics. The effectiveness 
of these policies is largely contested (Hertog 2010), but the policies epitomise the ambivalence of the 
“sovereign turn” as the  contradictions between “liberal” claims and the politics of the developmental 
state bestride officials’ discourses. 43 
4.2 Policing intermediation 
Migration policy changes have targeted the kafala, widely considered a source of migrant exploitation 
and abuses both by Gulf governments and human rights campaigners (Ratcliffe 2018). Thus 
governments place the blame for all migrant mistreatment on “sponsors” or employers, often 
confusing both and their respective legal roles. Reforms loosened control over migrants’ professional 
mobility (in Qatar and the UAE) but mostly aimed to replace government control over immigration 
and immigrants’ lives (in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia).  
Constraints on job changes were loosened in Kuwait in 2009 and 2011. In Qatar, several attempts to 
abolish the system were unsuccessful, only textually replacing “sponsors” with “recruiters” in 2016 
(AFP 2016), then finally lifting employer authorisation to leave the country (exit visas) in 2018 and 
extending the measure to domestic workers in 2019.44  
In Bahrain, migrant control was transferred to a state agency. King Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa created 
the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) in 2006 to strengthen government control over 
labour migration and replace sponsors; the kafala was “formally” dismantled in 2009. The LMRA 
 
42 The HRDF wage subsidies program started in 2012 and covered 50 percent of the difference between 
nationals’ salary and expatriate ones on a given position. It then increased to 30 percent of the national’s salary. 
The subsidies cap increased from SAR 2000 per month (approximately EUR 481 or USD 534) in 2012 to SAR 
4,000 (approximately EUR 962 or USD 1068) in 2014, and its duration was extended to four years. Officials 
argue that subsidies are temporary (aiming at “upskilling”) and should decrease with an increase in “the market 
value of Saudi workers,” but since 2012, the level of financial support has remained high. The withdrawing of 
governmental support was “hard to imagine” in 2017. Interview with HRDF officials, Riyadh, January 2015 and 
2017. 
43 Interview, Ministry of Labour, Riyadh, January 2015. 
44 Workers still had to ask their employer to “leave” and nonpayment as well as abuses remain numerous despite 
increased fines and penalties for employers. 
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reintroduced control over labour mobility and residence rights in 2011 and imposed fees on job 
changes and work permits (LMRA 2016). It became the sponsor of all immigrants, transferring to a 
state agency the functions performed by individuals, recruiters, or employers. 
In Saudi Arabia, the 2013 reform of the recruitment sector transferred sponsorship rights to state-
licenced recruitment agencies. The reform targeted large companies and aimed to limit the role of 
individual sponsors, especially for the retail trade and domestic work sectors that offered space for 
informal practices outside of state control. The Labour Ministry pushed the 21 licenced recruitment 
companies to serve as sponsors for maids, drivers, gardeners, shopkeepers, etc. paid by the hour. 45 
For the recruitment company studied in Riyadh, this translated into more control over workers who 
were selected in their countries of origin, brought over in large numbers, and housed in buildings 
under electronic surveillance, with work hours controlled and their salary paid directly to the 
company.46 
The kafala illustrates the complex interweaving of public and private interests in “migration 
infrastructures” (Xiang and Lindquist 2014) and the relationship between state policies and brokerage 
(Triandafyllidou 2018). Far from being a “private” institution, the kafala stemmed from commercial 
and religious law (Ahmed ‘Abdel Khaleq 1986) with a colonial legacy (Al-Shehabi 2019) to organise  
“state sponsored bonded-labour” (Frantz 2013). As shown in other contexts, employer or family 
sponsorship is classically embedded in immigration policies (Lahav 1998; Rosenblum and Cornelius 
2012) through visa policies with entry and residence conditional on labour or family ties. Across the 
legal-illegal frontier47 and the public-private divide, brokers play a key role in the “implementation” 
of state policies. But as shown by development anthropologists, these social actors “do not simply 
(…) execute norms, (…) [they] are also in a position to carve out room for maneuver” (Bierschenk et 
al. 2002, 10). Since the 1990s, governments have actively sought to police intermediation through 
legal and administrative reforms, as they had identified the kafala as a source of regulatory failure 
both in migrant control and protection (Fernandez 2013). Anti-kafala reforms were generally 
unpopular and opposed by citizens and recruitment-based interest groups defending an income-
generating process for locals (Diop et al. 2015), what can be called a “secondary rentierism” 
(SaadEddin 1982). Such opposition explains the limits of effective reforms across the region.  
Furthermore, a shift towards a state-controlled sponsorship system might not liberalise migration 
processes. As anthropologists have shown since the 1980s, evidence of exploitative intermediation 
overshadows practical ambiguities (Beaugé 1986; Longva 2005; Vora and Koch 2015). Kafala can 
 
45 Interviews, Ministry of Labour and recruitment businessmen, Riyadh, 2015. 
46 Fieldwork observations, Riyadh, 2013, 2015. 
47 The debate on brokerage in liberal democracies is usually associated with irregular migration or smuggling 
with various profiles of intermediaries (Ambrosini 2017). 
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work as a relationship of “protection/collaboration,” particularly for long-term residents (Longuenesse 
1988, p. 3), and it allows migrants to escape state control notably in times of anti-immigrant policies 
or harsher labour market control. When employers and sponsors are not the same person, a kafil can 
“sign a worker off” from his/her employer and the worker can still maintain his/her residence rights.  
So called “free visas” provided by sponsors allow migrants to enter a GCC country without a job 
contract despite labour regulations.48 Kufala’ can also sign for visas and resident permits of migrants’ 
family members. An Eritrean woman told me she brought family members to Riyadh in the 1990s 
thanks to her kafil, for whom she worked as a maid. After leaving her job and becoming a nurse, her 
former employer remained her kafil, allowing her to work between hospitals and private practices 
while keeping her residence rights.49 In these anecdotal cases, kafala can both reinforce or mitigate 
exploitative labour structures and regulations, but in the context of enhanced control, it can be used to 
circumvent the state.  
 Everywhere except Bahrain the role of the individual sponsor remains central for domestic workers 
and workers in the retail trade, which together account for large numbers of migrants in the region.50 
Rather than rights-based governance, reforms led to more informality, particularly for more low-
skilled workers. 
4.3 Differential exclusion: Class-based migration 
governance 
Migration policies have historically differentiated between highly skilled and low-skilled workers for 
residence or labour rights, creating class-based migration governance (Cohen 1988; Van Hear 2014) 
and regimes of differential inclusion in Western contexts (De Genova 2017; Könönen 2018). In the 
Gulf, class-based migration governance was progressively institutionalised, creating regimes of 
differential exclusion as states started to legally stratify access to socioeconomic rights based on skill 
level, income, and gender. 
4.3.1 Residence rights 
In the wake of labour reforms, international organisations and some voices from within GCC societies 
 
48 Paradoxically, labour market reforms and nationalisation constraints led to higher recruitment costs and less 
labour market flexibility. Numerous employers decided to hire sponsored workers without work contracts, 
especially unskilled workers in small and medium businesses. Even after the anti-kafala reforms, there were 
more “free visas” than before. In Bahrain, as the government realised this unexpected outcome, the LRMA 
introduced the “Flexi Permit” of two years in exchange for a fee for workers who terminated their work 
contract, thus officialising the “free visa.” See LRMA website http://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/325 [accessed 
May 8, 2019]. 
49 Interviews, Riyadh, 2006 and 2015. 
50 Saudi Arabia alone counted 2.4 million domestic workers and 2 million in “retail trade” out of around 10 
million migrant workers in 2017 (General Statistics Agency, Saudi Arabia 2017). 
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raised debates about permanent or long-term residency for expatriates (Fakkar 2009) as the long-term 
presence of foreign workers started to become more obvious (Assaf 2017; Thiollet 2010; Vora2013). 
New regulations tend to limit the duration of stay of unskilled foreigners and grant long-term 
residence to the wealthiest, reinforcing social and economic inequalities and “tiering” of citizenship 
and residency (Jamal 2015).51  
Kuwait has capped family reunification based on workers’ income since 1992 (Government of Kuwait 
1992) and has discussed limiting the duration of stay of immigrants since the 1980s (Stanton Russell 
1989).  
The UAE imposed a six-year limit on duration of stay for all migrants but exempts wealthy 
“expatriates” who own private estates or invest in the Emirates. Long-term visas and residence rights 
(five or ten years) became accessible in February 2019 for specific categories of highly skilled 
professionals and their families without kufala’ (General Directorate of Residency and Foreigners 
Affairs 2019). Family reunification is only open to wealthy immigrants: males earning more than 
AED 4,000 per month (or AED 3,000 plus accommodation) and women earning more than AED 
10,000 per month (or AED 8,000 plus accommodation). If they live in Abu Dhabi and work as an 
engineer, teacher, doctor, or in the medical sector, they also have family reunification rights.  
Saudi Arabia did not enforce class-based discrimination until a royal decree introduced an eight-year 
residence cap for unskilled workers in 2015. In 2017, the Saudi government introduced a fee on 
dependents’ residence.52 The fee disincentivises or directly impedes family reunification for less-paid 
workers while having little impact on wealthy expats.  It led to the departure of dependents among 
low-income families in fall 2017. 
The Gulf monarchies pushed to an extreme the financial discrimination in residence rights observed in 
most industrialised countries (Shachar and Hirschl 2014) by preventing long-term settlement except 
for the wealthiest and engineering mass “precarious non-citizenship” (Goldring and Landolt 2013). 
4.3.2 Labour rights 
With a rapid increase in local wealth and living standards as well as booming urbanisation, domestic 
and construction workers are two groups that particularly suffer from abuses and exploitative 
practices, the former at household level, the latter through mass-scale migrant import. If labour 
reforms introduced protective measures, such as maximum work hours, mandatory insurance, a cap in 
 
51 Microethnographies on Sri Lankan maids (Gamburd 1995), construction workers in Qatar (Gardner et al. 
2013), Indian middle-class migrants in Dubai (Vora 2013), and British expatriates in the UAE (Walsh 2014) 
document how social conditions and livelihoods of immigrants vary.  
52 The fee started at SAR 100 (approximately EUR 25 or USD 27) per dependent per month in 2017 and 
increases by SAR 100 yearly. 
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recruitment fees and sometimes minimum wages, they also institutionalised inequality in access to 
rights, notably by excluding domestic workers from mainstream labour law. A population of around 
3.5 million domestic workers remains formally excluded from general labour laws in Kuwait (art. 5) 
(Government of Kuwait 2015, 2010), Oman (art. 2) (Ministry of Manpower 2003), and Qatar (section 
3. art. 28) (State of Qatar 2004); in Bahrain, domestic workers are excluded despite recent reforms 
(Kingdom of Bahrain 2014, 2013). This legal gap, the employer-kafil collusion described earlier,  and 
the material conditions of domestic work (in their employers’ homes) offer institutional and material 
grounds for exploitation: nonpayment, underpayment, or delay in payment of wages, retaining of 
passport for coercive purposes, and lack of social insurance and health coverage (Gardner et al. 2013). 
Reforms thus not only reinforced existing class-based governance but also maintained other vectors of 
differential housing policies and differential policing of public spaces. Ethnographies have 
documented how unskilled workers are housed in remote “camps” away from the city of Doha with 
no public transportation apart from the employing companies’ buses, which only operate towards 
work sites (Bruslé 2012). Public spaces (streets, squares, and corniches) and leisure spaces such as 
malls are subject to intersectional policing along gender, racial, and class lines. Young men of darker 
skin colour are identified by police or private security guards as lower-class foreign workers and 
prevented from circulating freely (Thiollet 2010). Formal and informal practices of segregation 
exercised by recruiters, employers, and real estate agents, as well as police and private guards, enforce 
a hierarchical and discriminatory migration governance.  
 
5 Conclusion 
The empirical findings from the Gulf case resonate within broader debates in migration research. The 
sovereign turn taken by authoritarian monarchies in migration management unsettles the idea that 
governance is a “non-hierarchical” interplay of public and private actors sometimes described as 
“governance with government” (Risse 2013, 9-10). But it also debunks the illusion of all-powerful 
authoritarian states by unveiling how immigration policies emerged in public-private partnerships and 
how power configurations changed across recent periods. Studying Gulf migration thus invites to 
revisit the tension between state and nonstate actors beyond the “liberal paradox” (Hollifield 1992) 
across regimes and contexts.  
This paper’s empirical findings also bring into the discussion the illiberal structures and practices of 
migration governance from a situated perspective. As it has been noted for extraterritorial 
authoritarian practices (Glasius 2018), the coexistence of liberal and illiberal practices and policies 
can be observed across political regimes. With security concerns driving migration governance within 
IMI Working Papers Series 2019, No. 155 
 
26 
and between countries (Adamson 2006; Choucri 2002; Rudolph 2003; Weiner 1993), states tend to 
enforce discriminatory regulations or informal practices along nationalities or ethnicities, as the 
infamous 2017 “Muslim ban” illustrated for the United States. Such discriminations intersect with 
skill- and class-based ones induced by the global competition for talent. As empirical and normative 
research on discriminations and visa or citizenship policies usually focus on rich citizens in liberal 
democracies (Mau2010; Shachar and Hirschl 2014), we take the debate to the Global South where 
extreme forms of class-based differential rights are also observed.  
Contrary to the liberal convergence hypothesis (Cornelius et al. 1994; Hollifield 1992), global 
migration might be increasingly managed globally on hierarchical grounds, shaping migrants’ rights 
to move and settle. Although large N comparative policy indexes supporting these findings do not 
include Gulf countries (de Haas et al. 2018), the GCC monarchies offer a heuristic standpoint to 
observe the (re)structuring of migration governance through intersectional hierarchies. This paper 
therefore calls for more scientific investigations into comparative studies across regime types in order 
to assess the global relevance of illiberal practices and policies.  
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